Examining the Morality of the U.S. Atomic Bombings: Strategic Necessity or Controversial Decision?
Abstract
The morality of the two atomic bombings conducted by the United States on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has long raised contention among both strategists and the general public. This paper discusses the strategic context of World War II’s Pacific theater and proposes that despite the unprecedented “cruelty” casted on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic weapons, the bombs were dropped out of the strategic necessity to bring a swift end to the war. By reviewing the diaries of key commanders, the U.S. Army’s reports and forecasts of a land invasion of Japan, and account of Japanese resilience and unfathomable refusal to surrender under conventional circumstances, this study demonstrates that by forcing an early Japanese surrender, the atomic attacks obviated a land invasion of Japan, which would have inflicted much heavier casualties and thus provide the moral underpinnings of the atomic weapon attacks.
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