Communications in Humanities Research ISSN: 2753-7072
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Research Article

The Possibility of Artificial Qualia

Xiang WangZhejiang University*

* Corresponding author: [email protected]

Abstract

The discussions about qualia are mind-body problems. If artificial intelligence provides a functionally identical body, will it possess the same conscious experience? The possibility of artificial qualia, which is on the cutting edge of the development of artificial intelligence, will be the main topic of this essay. This paper argues the presupposition of the possibility of artificial qualia is the possibility of strong AI. Searl was the first person to question the possibility of strong AI by formulating the Chinese Room Argument. This paper introduces common objections from artificial intelligence practitioners and the development of modern AI, proving the invalid of the objection and claiming the possibility of strong AI. Next, this paper follows David Chalmers’ argument about the principle of organizational invariance and reconstructs Chalmers’ two Reductio ad Absurdum arguments to rebut objections. By formulating fading qualia argument and dancing qualia argument, the absent qualia argument and the inverted qualia argument are proved wrong. The principle can support the possibility of artificial qualia.

Keywords: qualia; strong AI; the principle of organizational invariance
Published: September 14, 2023
DOI: 10.54254/2753-7064/6/20230083
Volume: CHR Vol.6
pp. 67-71
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