The Viet Minh's Diplomatic Strategy Toward the Chinese Nationalist Government, 1945–1946
Abstract
After the August Revolution of 1945, the newly established Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) faced an unusually constrained diplomatic environment. French authorities sought to restore colonial rule, while the Chinese Nationalist Government, the then legitimate government of China, deployed forces into northern Vietnam pursuant to the Allied arrangements for accepting the Japanese surrender. This paper examines how the Viet Minh adjusted its strategy toward the Chinese Nationalist Government between 1945 and 1946. Drawing on Chinese diplomatic and party archives, Vietnamese party documents, French diplomatic records, British reports, United States materials, and contemporary memoirs, it argues that the Viet Minh did not treat relations with China as an isolated bilateral issue. Instead, it placed them within a triangular Chinese-French-Vietnamese configuration. The Viet Minh initially avoided direct confrontation, emphasized Vietnamese nationalism to address the Nationalist Government's political concerns regarding communist influence, and made limited political accommodations in response to Chinese military and political demands. It then used Sino-French tensions to resist French pressure while simultaneously negotiating with France in order to facilitate the withdrawal of Chinese troops. Once the Chinese military presence receded, the Viet Minh moved decisively against Vietnamese nationalist parties that had maintained close ties with the Nationalist Government. The case demonstrates how a newly established revolutionary government used flexible diplomacy amid changing relations among China, France, and Vietnam to preserve political autonomy during a moment of extreme vulnerability.
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