Communications in Humanities Research ISSN: 2753-7072
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Research Article

The Third-Person Effect During the Reception of AI-Driven Misinformation and Its Influence on Policy Support

Ziqiang Zhang*
Communication University of China

* Corresponding author: [email protected]

Abstract

Rapid generative AI development is transforming information production, and repeated exposure to AI-generated falsehoods may fuel public calls for restriction. Based on Davison's "third-person effect" theory, data from 146 valid questionnaires collected online were subjected to paired-sample t-test, regression analysis, and Process macro processing. In light of this phenomenon, the author attempts to study three aspects: first, whether audiences exhibit a third-person effect after seeing AI-generated false information; second, whether this perceptual difference makes people more supportive of the government introducing strict AI regulatory policies; third, whether AI literacy plays a moderating role in this process. The data results supported the first two hypotheses but denied the third. Overall, the contributions of this paper are as follows: first, it verifies that the third-person effect still holds in the context of AI content; second, this bias does make the public endorse more radical regulatory measures, and policymakers can use this to build social consensus and thereby introduce relevant policies; finally, it suggests that AI literacy may have a more complex influence on the "perception - support" chain, thus encouraging other researchers to conduct more in-depth investigations.

Keywords: third-person effect; AI-generated content; AI literacy; policy support; disinformation
Published: September 22, 2026
DOI: 10.54254/2753-7064/2026.BJ36991
Volume: CHR Vol.119
pp. 109-117
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