Comparative Analysis of Risk Allocation in Advance Sales of Commercial Housing Between Hong Kong and Mainland
Abstract
While the pre-sale system of commercial housing accelerates housing supply, it also poses unfinished construction risks due to frequent loopholes in implementation. This article compares the differences in pre-sale risk allocation between mainland China and Hong Kong, and finds that while the relevant institutional forms in the two regions are similar, the risk-bearing entities, control points, and constraint mechanisms are distinctly different: Mainland home buyers essentially bear the main construction risks, and the resolution of risks relies on post-event guarantees; Hong Kong controls risks proactively through strict access control and prudent lending practices by banks. The fundamental difference in risk allocation between the two lies in the government incentive structure -- Local governments in the mainland possess dual identities as both regulators and stakeholders; whereas the Hong Kong government exhibits stronger regulatory rigidity. Based on this, this article proposes suggestions such as improving the legal system, drawing on Hong Kong's pre-control approach, strengthening the project approval process, enhancing the rigidity of fund supervision, and improving the judicial system, providing a reference for the optimization of relevant systems in the mainland.
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