A Study of the Admissibility of an Ambivalent Multi-subjectivity in Donald Davidson’s Holistic Argument in Inclusivity of Language
Abstract
As one of the most prominent figure in linguistic and analytic philosophy, Donald Davidson’s revolutionary reconceptualization on concept of objectivity and conceptual scheme has been conceived as substantial for epistemology, and it begs the need to explore further on what such revelation in the most profound epistemological concept could denote further. The paper then seeks to demonstrate that Donald Davidson's holistic argument for language inclusivity engenders, permits, and further pursues an ambivalent concept of multi-subjectivity, admitting it not only as a premise but also as a founding ground on which he built his philosophical proclamation. The paper would first introduce the main concepts that Davidson employs in his argument of conceptual scheme, as well as Davidson's general understanding of conceiving language as interdependent on local contextuality and dismissing an exclusive view on objectivity and subjectivity that precludes the possibility of a holistic understanding of knowledge; then it would continue the argument by analyzing the necessary antecedents and assumptions that Davidson employs in his argument. Thus showing that the premises are crucial in understanding Davidson’s attitude toward knowledge in general as in they are deeply embodied in his theory instead of superfluous attached or inferred by fabricated reasoning. Moreover, the existent of the premises, in fact, denote a specific concealed understanding on epistemological agent within Davidson’s framework that admit the ambivalence of multi-subjectivity: the epistemic agent that is the direct performing agent that convey and receive language while the evaluation agent designated to evaluate and analyze language reciprocally.
References
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