

The Unity of the Limits — On Wittgenstein's Self, Language and Ethical Will

Xiyuan Xu

*School of Philosophy and Sociology, Jilin University, Changchun, China
1778352250@qq.com*

Abstract. This paper reconstructs the relationship between the self, language (the world), and value in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* from the perspective of "limits," revealing their ontological unity. Language serves as the image of the world constructed by the self—a reflection of factual reality. The self functions as the transcendental condition and limit between language and the world, embodying both metaphysical subjectivity and ethical will. Value represents the transcendental stance of ethical will toward the world; it alters the meaning of the world rather than factual matters and remains unsayable. These three elements form an integrated structure: language expresses within limits, the self and ethical will transcend limits, while the value world beyond limits, though inexpressible, serves as the ultimate orientation of meaning. Limits are not mechanical or static divisions of the self, language, and value, but rather logical hubs for generating and transcending meaning. By demonstrating this unity, this paper aims to provide a holistic perspective for understanding Wittgenstein's early philosophical thoughts.

Keywords: limit, self, value, language, unity

1. Introduction

In the development of philosophy, concepts such as "self" and "language" are regarded as objective entities in the world. The self is considered an empirical subject, and language a tool for communication—both can be described in an objectified manner. However, Wittgenstein reverses this traditional presupposition in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. The self is not a substance in the world, but the limit that enables the world to be given; language is not a mere tool, but a picture that shares a formal structure with the world; ethical value, being incapable of being expressed by factual propositions, resides outside the world and manifests itself silently. According to Wittgenstein, the self is the limit of the world, language is the picture of the world, and ethical value lies beyond the world. Then, how can these three achieve systematic unity through the concept of "limit"? Based on Wittgenstein's early texts, this paper conducts an in-depth exploration of this question. The structure of the paper is as follows: the first section discusses the isomorphism of the world and language; the second section clarifies that the self is the limit of the world; the third section demonstrates how the self, language, and value achieve unity based on the concept of limit. This study aims to provide an operable approach for subsequent research: instead of mechanically dividing Wittgenstein's "sayable" and "unsayable" parts, we should understand them as a whole with

"limit" as the core, thereby grasping the relationship between the self, language, and value as different aspects of the limit.

2. The isomorphism of the world and language

The metaphysical self delineates the limit of the world. Within this limit, the world exists, and the self employs language to describe the world. As a reflection, language and the world possess isomorphism.

The world is all that is the case, i.e., the totality of facts. Once these facts are determined, the world is also determined. This differs from traditional epistemology, which defines the world as the sum of empirical objects. The facts that determine the world are the existence of states of affairs, and the totality of existing states of affairs constitutes the world.

Language is a picture of facts created by the self to depict the world; it is a product of ethical will and a reflection of the world. A picture is itself a fact. For the facts composing the world to be successfully depicted, language must share something in common with the depicted objects (facts) and must be isomorphic with the world—only then can it become a picture of facts. From Wittgenstein's perspective, the essence of language is to construct pictures, and the purpose of picture-construction is to show how things are [1].

The isomorphism between linguistic pictures and the world is manifested in their shared pictorial form, i.e., logical form. Wittgenstein points out: "A fact can be a picture only if it has something in common with what it depicts" [2]. As long as a picture can depict reality in the end, it must share logical form with reality. When the pictorial form coincides with the logical form, a logical picture is generated. Logical pictures possess the fundamental property of being able to depict the world, but their truth or falsity cannot be distinguished merely from the pictures themselves—they need to be compared with reality. A picture that conforms to reality is a true picture. "The logical picture of the fact is the thought" [2]. To express itself, thought must rely on tools perceptible to the senses, i.e., propositions. These tools possess both intellectual and perceptual characteristics [3]. Thought is a meaningful proposition, and the totality of propositions constitutes language. However, a mechanical combination of characters cannot form a proposition; only a "logical picture" isomorphic with the structure of reality is meaningful. Thought also contains the possibility of truth or falsity regarding the situation being thought about, and the whole composed of true thoughts is the picture of the world. What cannot be thought lies outside the world and cannot be described either. Therefore, language can accurately "hook onto" the world through pictures and describe facts. Consequently, language and the world are isomorphic due to their shared logical form, achieving the unity of the linguistic system and the ontological system of the world [4].

3. The self as the limit

The world and language are isomorphic—whatever can be depicted by language is a reflection of the world. If the meaning of language lies entirely in its ability to depict facts, then where is the subject that engages in the activity of depicting with language and constructs the world located? This subject is not included in the linguistic picture of the world, because the logical structure of the world determines the limit of language, and the limit of language ultimately reveals the position of the self. This section explores Wittgenstein's concept of the self and its key role in the philosophy of language.

The self is the transcendental limit of language and the world, and the metaphysical subject. It is not an empirical object in traditional epistemology, but the transcendental condition for the

possibility of language and the world. In language, it manifests itself as the "speaker," yet it cannot be spoken of by language itself. The self is the bearer of ethical will, and it manifests itself only through the attitude of ethical will toward the world. In ethical will, it serves as the limit of value. Language also cannot reach the self that bears ethical will. The self and ethical will exist in the same transcendent domain, and both are excluded from language.

3.1. The self as the transcendental condition of language

According to Wittgenstein, the self, as the subject, is the transcendental condition of language. Language is a reflection of the world, and the self is the initiator of this projection. To illustrate this, Wittgenstein proposes a classic analogy: he compares the "self" to an "eye" and "language" to the "visual field" observed by the eye. The eye can see the entire visual field, but the eye itself is not within the visual field; yet without the eye, the visual field cannot be seen. Thus, the eye, as the condition for the visual field, indicates that the self is the transcendental condition and limit of language. This exactly corresponds to Wittgenstein's idea that "the subject does not belong to the world but is a limit of the world" [2]. This idea bears a resemblance to Kant's view of the self as "transcendental apperception." Kant holds that the "transcendental self (apperception)" is the logical prerequisite for all knowledge; it can actively "legislate" for the phenomenal world, i.e., spontaneously subsume empirical cognitive materials under categories [5], thereby endowing the manifold of representations with the universal connection of self-representations belonging to the cognitive subject. However, the transcendental self, as the absolute subject and the constitutive limit of the world, is merely a subject = X—it can only be thought, but cannot be experienced as a real object [6]. Both Kant and Wittgenstein argue that the self is a limit and a transcendental condition, rather than an empirical object. The difference lies in that the former regards the self as the limit of knowledge, while the latter considers it the limit of language. The self discussed here is different from Descartes' concept: Descartes advocates "Cogito, ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am), regarding the self as a substance and establishing a dualistic opposition between the self and the world—"when the human mind engages in self-reflection, it can only see itself and nothing else" [7]. It also differs from Nietzsche's view of the self as a "fighter in the world" dominated by power: the will to power is an inexhaustible creative life-will, and the self struggles for power [8]. Jiang Yi points out: "Wittgenstein's concept of the self has undergone a fundamental shift from the transcendental to the grammatical, and from the limit to practice. The early 'metaphysical subject' is a product of logicism [9], while the later 'dissolved self' is an inevitable conclusion of the theory of language games. This transformation reveals the consistency of the core of his philosophy: opposing any form of metaphysical substance, whether it is called 'logical atom' or 'transcendental self' [10]. It is evident that Wittgenstein firmly opposes the substantialization of the self or the subject in both his early and later thoughts.

Since language and the world are isomorphic, language, as the picture of the world, can accurately "hook onto" the world; furthermore, since the self is the transcendental condition of language, the self is also the transcendental condition of the world. Thus, the "self-world" relationship and the "self-language" relationship are essentially isomorphic, both reflecting the relationship between the self (as the metaphysical subject) and the products of its will. The only difference is the transformation between "reality" and "picture" between these two types of products. In other words, language is like a "visual field" that depicts the total facts in the world, while the self is the "entity" that can be abstracted, employs language, engages in description, and thinks about the real world. From the moment language is "pictorialized," it inherently carries a boundary of ability—being able to depict possible facts and only the sum of facts in the world. However, the self exists

outside this boundary, for it is not a fact in the world. All "I"s that can be described by language (such as "I feel pain" or "I want to cry") refer to the "person" with a soul in a biological or psychological sense—merely a fact, object, attribute, or event in the world. What we intend to explore but ultimately cannot discuss is the real, non-objective self: it is the "premise" or "site" for the possibility of language, and the logical condition for the possibility of language and the world. As a propositional picture, language has its boundary of "what can be said" delimited by logic; in turn, the limit of logic is "delineated" by the self. Since logical form is the way the self understands and represents the world, the self cannot step outside this representational way to talk about it—just as the eye cannot step outside the visual field to see itself.

In summary, the conclusion that the self is the limit of language derives three implications: First, the self is the silent premise of language: as the speaking subject, the subject itself cannot be spoken of. Second, the world is my world: the world is not owned by me, but it is ultimately the world that I talk about, think about, and experience. Its mode of presentation and logical structure are determined by my language and my representational ability. Third, the self delineates the boundary between the "sayable" and the "unsayable," i.e., dividing two worlds: within the domain of language, facts in the world can freely exist, but they can never reach the "shore" of the self; logical forms, ethical values, and aesthetics manifest themselves proudly on this shore, beyond the evaluation of language. These are two worlds that cannot merge but yearn for each other.

3.2. The self as the bearer of ethical will

Wittgenstein's "self" is not a being in the world of phenomenal objects, but the logical prerequisite for the occurrence of thinking activities and the bearer of ethical will. Ethical will refers to the choices and will of an individual in practical or moral actions. Since the self possesses the ability to make moral judgments and choices, it can serve as the carrier of ethical will—and ethical will is the manifestation of the self (as the metaphysical subject) in practice. The self's role as the bearer of ethical will is reflected in two aspects: On the one hand, with the "self" as the core stance, ethical will gains the logical driving force for its "initiation." Ethical will is equivalent to the "chip" held by the "self" that enables the reconstruction of the world's meaning. On the other hand, both the self and ethical will are transcendent existences. The self cannot be described by language; like value, if it existed in the world, it would be reduced to an ordinary fact and lose its absoluteness. Therefore, the essence of the self is silent and transcendent. Ethical will can guide practical actions in the world independently of the world; thus, it is also transcendent, beyond the reach of language, and unsayable. Consequently, the subject of ethical will is the philosophical "metaphysical subject," i.e., the self. This subject is not an object in the world, but the limit of the world itself.

According to Wittgenstein, the object of ethical will differs from that of language. The object of language is the objective facts in the world that can be depicted by language. For example, the proposition "This is a computer" merely describes an objective, specific fact—namely, that a certain factual object is a computer. Language expresses such objective knowledge about the world through propositions composed of sentences. In contrast, the object of will exists in the transcendent ethical domain. Ethics is a transcendent thing, and the values of good and evil do not manifest themselves in the world [11]—that is, the subjective and internal "good" and "evil" cannot be expressed by language. Thus, ethical will is the will that makes value judgments of good and evil. Ethical propositions do not possess the logical structure of the world and belong to the "unsayable" domain; however, the world of will can be discussed and dominated by language, and its meaning feedback can be changed at any time through the descriptions we make to the will subject via language.

In conclusion, the self is not only the transcendental condition of language—without the self, language would lose its subject—but also the bearer of ethical will, realizing itself through ethical will. The metaphysical subject and the subject of ethical will are one and the same subject (i.e., the same self), while the world and value are the manifestations of different aspects of this same self.

4. The unity of the self, language, and value based on the limit

This section aims to demonstrate that in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein constructs a unified system centered on "limit" (Grenze), integrating ontology (the self as the origin of the limit), epistemology (the world is knowable yet unsayable internally, and language depicts the world), and ethics (ethical will manifests value beyond the limit).

As discussed earlier, the limit of the world is the totality of facts, delimited by logical space; the limit of language is manifested in the ability of propositions to depict facts, delimited by logical syntax; the limit of the self is manifested in the self (as the metaphysical subject) being the transcendental prerequisite of the world and language; the limit of ethical will is manifested in the opposition between transcendent value and the factual world. Thus, "limit" serves as the key to unifying the self, language, and value: within the limit, language expresses facts; in the limit, the self's will manifests itself; beyond the limit, value is unsayable.

First, the metaphysical self acts as the limit of the world. Logic pervades the world, and the empirical expression of logical space takes language as its carrier. Like logic, language can only exist within the world. Language can only describe the world from "this side." It is impossible for our language to contain logical expressions such as "there is this, there is that, but there is no that"—for this would require us to view the limit of the world from the other side. However, the subject of the limit has already determined that the empirical world (including language) cannot transcend the limit.

Nevertheless, the metaphysical self as the "limit of the world"—though a core issue of great concern in Wittgenstein's philosophical research, aiming to resolve the "egocentric predicament" in traditional empiricism—nevertheless gives rise to a new and more profound risk of "isolation" due to its extreme internality and transcendence. P.M.S. Hacker argues that although the solipsistic self in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* claims to be "world-less" and attempts to "salvage" the truth in solipsism by equating the self with the limit of the world (holding that the view "the world is my world" can conform to experience), it ultimately cannot escape its theoretical consequence: it cannot provide any logical space for the existence of other minds or the intersubjective public world. "If 'the world is my world' and the 'self' is the limit of the world, then other 'selves' can only exist as phenomena in my world. I cannot meaningfully assert that they possess an equivalent metaphysical subject that serves as the 'limit of the world'; other subjects are reduced to objects in the world" [12]. G.E.M. Anscombe, a student of Wittgenstein, also acutely points out that Wittgenstein's exclusion of the "self" from the world makes the matter of "having a body" extremely mysterious and incomprehensible. For "the metaphysical subject as the limit of the world is 'extensionless,' and it is impossible to determine which specific body it has a relationship of possession with. Why is the limit of the world the perspective of this body rather than that one?" [13] Wittgenstein's response to these questions is concentrated in his later work *Philosophical Investigations*: his argument against private language aims to prove that there is no completely private language—one that only the speaker can understand—for inner sensations. This illusion is a philosophical fantasy, arising from a mistaken picture of language and the mind; once people begin to correctly understand how language actually functions, this illusion dissipates.

Wittgenstein's view not only points out the existence of public language but also indicates the consistency between solipsism and realism. The essence of solipsism lies in the claim that the entire reality of the world is centered on "the self." My world is constituted by my language; what I cannot think, I cannot say either. If "I" is spoken of, then "I" is no longer "I"—for when "I" is spoken of, I am objectified, thereby losing my core position and being reduced to an existence on par with "my language." Therefore, being forever indescribable is the symbol of the status of "I"; "I" can only exist and manifest itself. If my life ends, then the world also ceases. Thus, Wittgenstein points out: "What solipsism wants to say is actually correct, but it cannot be said; instead, it manifests itself" [2]. What can be said or described are all the facts I discover, all described by the subject that "cannot be described"—i.e., by me. "Description" itself is the best proof that the subject exists independently, initiates actions, and is not mentioned by any of its products (language). Regarding what cannot be thought, we cannot speak of it either. This is because if "this" cannot be thought, it proves that "this" lies outside my world; yet what can be said must be describable by language and must be within my limit. There is a logical conflict in the positional relationship between what can be said and what cannot be thought. It can be seen from this that strictly implemented solipsism coincides with pure realism: "The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and the reality corresponding to it remains" [2]. Therefore, if I exist, the world exists; if the world exists, it is objective reality.

Wittgenstein also changed his criteria for determining the limit of the world, which stems from the transformation of his thoughts on the self between his early and middle-late periods. In his early period, Wittgenstein emphasized that the subject is the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world, rather than a part of the world. In his middle-late period, he distinguished between two usages of "I": the subjective usage and the objective usage. However, the overall tendency of his thoughts on the self remains consistent across different periods—all opposing objectivism. The fact that his so-called "limit" is not an object is the best proof of the consistency of his thoughts across the early and late periods.

Second, language speaks within the limit. The self, as the limit, is not an object but provides a horizon. Language, as a description of the world isomorphic with it within the limit, is the structure of this limit (the self). The world reflects a logical image on the "mirror" of language, and the self—as the limit—vanishes when touched. Through propositions, language becomes the picture of the world, and its meaning exists only in the logical depiction of possible states of affairs. Yet once it touches value or the subject itself, language encounters the constraint of the limit. It can thus be seen that when language reaches its limit, the "self"—as the speaker—is excluded from the world. While completing the objective representation of the world, language also proclaims the disappearance of the empirical self.

Third, value is unsayable beyond the limit. Since solipsism coincides with realism and "the world is my world," how does this relationship between the self and the world explain that "value" lies outside the world?

On the one hand, ethical will can explain the meaning of the world, and value or meaning itself is also associated with human ethical will. The world can have meaning only because of humans' (their will's) understanding of it. Humans are the limit of the world; only when the world is "willed" by humans can it connect with humans, generate meaning, and thus exist outside humans. In other words, "the world" and "the meaning or value of the world" exist relative to the logical position of humans. Therefore, "no existing thing in the world has value; even if value existed, it would be valueless" [2]—for existing things lack value content endowed by will. As a transcendence of the

limit (i.e., the world), value can only exist outside the world and become possible through the self (ethical will).

This way of thinking originates from the inheritance of Kantian philosophy. In the history of Western philosophy, value is usually regarded as something opposite to facts. In Kant's philosophy, he classifies facts into the natural domain of "what is" (Sein), and morality into the ethical domain of "what ought to be" (Sollen); value implies a kind of "ought." Wittgenstein's distinction between facts and values obviously inherits Kant's dichotomy, and his distinction between the metaphysical subject and the will subject also inherits Kant's view that the same subject is regarded as both a natural subject and a moral subject. The difference lies in that Kant understands value (good) as something that humans ought to possess through their free will, i.e., the object of ethical will [14]. In contrast, Wittgenstein understands value as the way or attitude in which our will regards the world. Value cannot be part of the world experienced by humans, but a transcendent manifestation of the world beyond it—and the limit here still lies in the "self."

Ethical will is bound to the limit of the world; it changes the way the world is regarded, as well as its meaning and value. Will can alter the meaning of facts; the self bears ethical will and drives the "movement" of value. Due to the difference between the will to happiness and the will to unhappiness, the two inevitably delineate different limits of the world. Therefore, a happy person and an unhappy person do not live in the same world, and they experience different overall meanings fed back by the world. "At death, the world does not change, but ceases" [2]—it ceases with the termination of will. Wittgenstein points out: "The will can only change the limits of the world, not facts" [2]. In other words, ethical will changes the way or attitude of the subject toward the world as a whole, which leads to a fundamental transformation in the meaning of the world as a whole for the subject. The factual world is completely covered by language (e.g., "The tree is in the rain" is a factual proposition) and cannot be changed by our will. The domain of value is generated through the attitude of will toward the world as a whole (e.g., "accepting the existence of the tree in the rain" is an ethical stance). Although meaning flows with changes in ethical will, facts remain fixed.

On the other hand, from the perspective of language: since language can only depict facts within the world, while value content is something that can only be apprehended intuitively but not expressed in words—incapable of being described by empirical language—it belongs to the "unsayable" domain in Wittgenstein's terms. Therefore, value must exist outside the world. Within the world, regardless of the contingency of facts and occurrences, they all exist and occur within the limit; "being within the world" defines their fundamental nature of "contingency." In contrast, if a value is truly valuable, it must possess "non-contingency" and exist outside the "contingency" of facts and occurrences—thus existing outside the world.

To sum up, language, the self, and value converge at the limit, completing a unified interpretation of "language speaks within the limit—the self manifests at the limit—value is reconstructed beyond the limit." The self, as the limit, is not an object but provides a horizon; language, as a description of the world isomorphic with it within the limit, is the structure of this limit (the self); while value is the transcendence of the limit (i.e., the world). To illustrate this unity more vividly, we can use an example: suppose we regard a room as the world, the window of the room as the self (serving as the limit), and language as the structure of the window (e.g., the glass). Only through the glass can light enter the room—similarly, only through language can facts fill the world. Value, on the other hand, is the domain outside the window; although it is not inside the room, we can only understand it through the window (the self: ethical will). In this way, language, the self, and value are vividly unified through the limit, forming three different aspects or dimensions of the limit structure. The

self is the position where the limit lies; language is the manifest form of the limit; value is the transcendent orientation of the limit. This limit is not a mechanical or static division of the self, language, and value, but a logical entry point for the "overflow" of meaning—and a holistic perspective for us to grasp Wittgenstein's thoughts.

After analyzing the unity of the world, the self, and value, we can summarize three important contributions of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*: First, from theoretical construction to delineating limits: when the domain of language is limited to the depiction of facts, all discussions about "self-substance," "moral laws," and "ultimate reality" are revealed as meaningless transgressions of language. Delineating limits becomes a prerequisite for philosophical theoretical construction. Second, the ontological transformation of ethics: ethics is no longer a product of certain theoretical norms, but a choice of the subject's will. Under ethical will, the world changes its existential impression along with the will: a "good will" helps us accept the totality of facts and become happy people; while an "evil will" leads to our resolute confrontation with the totality of facts and makes us unhappy people. Carl Jung's statement in *The Red Book*—"Your hell is made of all the things you have always refused" [15]—is a perfect embodiment of this view. It can thus be seen that the essence of ethical practice is an act of redrawing the limit of the world with a silent will. Third, the renewal of the self's life: where language ends, new values begin. The *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* points to a kind of existential wisdom that transcends limits: "We feel that even if all possible scientific questions are answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched" [2]. In other words, the meaning of the self—and the elusive value that humans pursue throughout their lives—does not manifest itself in the world spoken of by language, but exists in the silent practice of the unsayable domain. Only when humans stop clinging to propositional language, cease to insist on using language games to question "meaning," and instead embrace the ethical will that "holds" the limit—changing their attitude toward the world through ethical will—can the self, language, and ethical will achieve unity at the limit.

By re-examining the overall structure of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, we find that Wittgenstein constructs a unity of threefold limits: the limit of language is used to delineate what constitutes meaningful propositions and what constitutes meaningless ones—i.e., the "sayable"; the totality of facts depictable by language constitutes the world; and the self is confirmed within the limit of the entirety of language. This unity manifests as follows: the self is the origin of the limit; the interior of the limit is knowable yet unsayable (i.e., language depicts the world); and ethical will manifests value beyond the limit. This unity indicates that language is not only a tool held by the self to express its metaphysical will but also a cage of meaning and the world.

5. Conclusion

The fundamental value of Wittgenstein's above thoughts lies in delineating limits for subsequent philosophers to express the content of their thoughts—and he has precisely accomplished this historically significant task of "building a bridge." The task of future research will no longer be abstract generalization in a broad sense, but to fundamentally cross the limit and think about what cannot be thought. The interpretation of this unity of limits is precisely the value of this paper. The reason why language, the self, and value (as demonstrated in this paper) can achieve unity is that the limit serves as a prerequisite, endowing them with an inter-limiting relationship: based on the limit, language and the world have an isomorphic relationship, enabling language to depict the world; the self, carrying ethical will, manifests the limit, reaching a consensus that the factual world cannot be changed. Wittgenstein's final solemn declaration—"Whereof one cannot speak, one must pass over in silence"—seems to surrender to nihilism, but is actually a respect for the unshakable status of the

limit. Language expresses within "this side" of the limit; the self and ethical will stand "on" the limit; the new world "on the other side" of the limit, though silent, is the destination of meaning. After breaking free from the constraints of the limit, ethical will finds true freedom. This world embodies the ultimate meaning pursued by the limit: the ultimate unity of language, the self, and value—and the meaning of human existence. The limit helps us achieve a phased victory, but also leads us to a broader horizon: Can all situations describable by language be thought? For situations in reality to possess value, should they manifest themselves or need to be described by language? Wittgenstein's thoughts on the limit have already delineated a path for future thinking. The logical space beyond the limit is filled with questions, which will be practiced in the life of every ethical subject in the future. The propositional pictures symbolizing value attract the attention of the world within the limit—and the practice of ethical subjects is the value of the limit.

References

- [1] Du, S. H. (2019). Wittgenstein and the Microcosm of his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. *Contemporary Foreign Language Studies*, (05).
- [2] Wittgenstein. (2021). *Philosophy of Logic* (M. Huang, Ed.). Beijing: China Overseas Chinese Publishing House.
- [3] Xie, Q. (2012). A Comparative Study of Kant and Wittgenstein from a Methodological Perspective— The Fourth in the Series on Early Wittgenstein's Philosophical Thoughts on Language. *Foreign Language Journal*, (06).
- [4] Fang, S. Y., & Zhao, M. F. (2019). Wittgenstein's Ladder: On the "Sayable" and the "Unsayable". *Journal of Qiqihar University*, (02).
- [5] Yao, D. X. (2014). Wittgenstein on the Self. *Journal of Hebei University*, (07).
- [6] Kant. (2017). *Critique of Pure Reason* (X. M. Deng, Trans.; Z. T. Yang, Ed.). Beijing: People's Publishing House.
- [7] Descartes. (2019). *Meditations on First Philosophy* (L. Li, Trans.). Beijing: China Overseas Chinese Publishing House.
- [8] Nietzsche. (2023). *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (C. Q. Qian, Trans.). Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House.
- [9] Xie, M. (2012). Ontological Interpretation of the Significance View in "Image Theory" — An Expansionary Study on Wittgenstein's Theory of Meaning. *Foreign Language Journal*, (06).
- [10] Jiang, Y. (2009). *Analysis of Philosophy: A Course*. Beijing: Peking University Press.
- [11] Dai, H. Q. (2016). Wittgenstein's Ethical Thought and Its Internal Dilemma. *Journal of Wuhan University (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition)*, (07).
- [12] Hark, P. (2022). *Insight and Illusion: A Study of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Themes* (L. G. Zhang, Ed.). Beijing: The Commercial Press.
- [13] Anscombe, E. (1974). *The First Person*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- [14] Kant. (2016). *Critique of Practical Reason* (X. M. Deng, Trans.; Z. T. Yang, Ed.). Beijing: People's Publishing House.
- [15] Jung, C. G. (2016). *Red Book* (S. Shamdasani, Trans.). Beijing: China Machine Press.