Research Article

The Structural Limits of Title VII in Addressing Intersectional Discrimination

Yanyi LiKambala School*

* Corresponding author: [email protected]

Abstract

This paper examines the structural limits of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in addressing intersectional discrimination. While the statute prohibits employment discrimination “because of race” and “because of sex,” its categorical design requires courts to treat each ground discretely, producing legal invisibility for women of colour whose harms cannot be parsed into single axes. Through doctrinal analysis, the paper interrogates this paradox: Title VII has achieved significant advances, from recognising sex stereotyping in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins to dismantling overt exclusionary practices, yet its single-axis framework consistently erases intersectional claims, as illustrated by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and DeGraffenreid v. General Motors. Engaging with jurisprudential theory, the analysis situates Title VII within broader debates between Hart’s positivist emphasis on rule-based clarity. The paper argues that equality statutes function as boundaries: they forbid certain conduct but cannot repair systemic subordination. Comparative reference to international frameworks such as CEDAW highlights alternative models of substantive equality, though enforcement remains weak. The conclusion considers both legislative reform and judicial reinterpretation but emphasises the central paradox of equality law: the very clarity that secures its enforceability also renders it least capable of recognising injustice in its most entrenched, intersectional forms.

Keywords: Title VII; sex stereotyping; disparate impact
Published: November 11, 2025
DOI: 10.54254/2753-7064/2025.HT29388
Volume: CHR Vol.97
pp. 7-15
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