Communications in Humanities Research ISSN: 2753-7072
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Research Article

Independent or Complementary? On the Role of Crisp’s Sufficiency Principle in Contemporary Distributive Justice

Ruanzhengqi SunUniversity of Manchester*

* Corresponding author: [email protected]

Abstract

Sufficientarianism is one of the most influential approaches in contemporary distributive justice, and Crisp’s version is generally regarded as the most promising among them. This paper aims to explore whether, under today’s global political and economic circumstances, Crispian sufficientarianism can serve as a feasible normative framework for distributive justice. It also asks whether such a framework can safeguard the “priority” of groups below the threshold without relying on other distributive principles such as egalitarianism. Firstly, drawing on the theory of needs, an inherently coherent inclusion criterion for the Crispian threshold is established. Subsequently, an examination of practical experiences in the field of aid and development suggests that the root causes of poverty cannot be truly revealed, if the dis-empowerment of groups below the threshold by those above it is ignored. Thus, an intrinsic tension arises between the “priority” and “independence” of the threshold. Finally, it can be concluded that Crisp’s version of sufficientarianism can hardly be justified if it is divorced from egalitarian goals: without fundamental institutional reforms, simply setting a threshold to compensate the poor is both inefficient and unsustainable.

Keywords: Roger Crisp; sufficientarianism; distributive justice; threshold; global poverty
Published: October 14, 2025
DOI: 10.54254/2753-7064/2025.HT28279
Volume: CHR Vol.88
pp. 63-68
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