Fuzzy Logic: Blurring the Line Between True and False
Abstract
Since Aristotle’s time, classical two-valued logic has been the foundation of Western rational thought. One of its most important principles, the law of excluded middle, states that every statement must be either true or false, with no in between. But when the situation is changed from the formal language to the everyday human language, there are a lot of unclear terms like “tall”, “bald”, and “pile”. These terms cannot be clearly labeled as completely true or false, and their existence challenges the absolute authority of classical binary logic. This raises a key philosophical and logical question: how to deal with this common uncertainty in life? The idea of “fuzzy logic” was first suggested by L. Zadeh in the 1960s, who claims that traditional set theory does not work for describing the complex problems humans face in real-world systems because it focuses on absolutes. Therefore, solving such problems requires a theory of fuzziness. This paper aims to examine this claim. First, this paper talks about the classic problems that come up when things are vague and explains the basic ideas of fuzzy logic. Then, it looks at the big ideas behind it and how they can be used in the real world. Finally, after looking closely at these applications, the paper makes more conclusions. The value of fuzzy logic consists in its practicality, not its status as a philosophical theory of truth.
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