Nozick and Gettier-style Problems: Reviewing the Sensitivity Condition

Abstract

This essay explores the challenges of analyzing knowledge by focusing on the Gettier problem and the notion of sensitivity. The Gettier problem highlights that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. Sensitivity is introduced as a condition to address Gettier cases by requiring that a belief tracks the truth of the proposition. However, sensitivity clashes with the concept of closure that states knowledge being closed under entailment. This creates a dilemma: giving up sensitivity or closure. The essay argues for rejecting sensitivity because it has more problems than closure. First, even without closure, it's difficult to reconcile everyday knowledge with the limitations imposed by sensitivity. Second, sensitivity struggles to address all Gettier cases. Finally, a modified Gettier recipe is presented to demonstrate how sensitivity is vulnerable to counterexamples. The essay concludes that both attempts to revise Nozick’s conditions of knowledge with sensitivity and the traditional project of analyzing knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions face significant challenges.