Analysis of the Moral Philosophy of Abortion
Abstract
The US Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade in 2022, ending 50 years of the protection of women’s abortion rights by constitution. This incident has increased the urgency of resolving the ongoing dispute over the morality of women's abortion rights. The debate is centred on whether a fetus has a personality right, and whether this right could override a woman's right to abortion. This essay will examine arguments that it is immoral to abort a fetus even if it cannot be defined as a person, as well as those that it is not immoral to abort a fetus even if it can be defined as a person. Finally, as a fetus is not a member of the moral community, the argument that its right to life cannot override a woman's right to abortion will be defended. These arguments lead to one conclusion: abortion is not immoral.
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