

Social Inequality in the Age of AI: Implications for Labor, Wage Distribution, and Worker Power

Xiao Jia^{1,a,*}

¹*Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia*

a. Moshook@163.com

**corresponding author*

Abstract: This article critically examines the multifaceted impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on social stratification, situated within the broader historical context of automation-driven productivity advances. Drawing on empirical evidence and evolving theoretical frameworks, we elucidate the intricate dynamics of labor market transformation, skill obsolescence, and wage distribution in the nascent AI epoch. We employ a nuanced task-based approach to move beyond simplistic dichotomies of skill-biased technological change, offering a granular understanding of AI-induced labor market polarization. Our analysis reveals that AI is reshaping the contours of inequality through complex interactions of skill restructuring, wage decoupling from productivity, and shifts in worker bargaining power. We argue that the current trajectory of AI development may accelerate capital-biased technological change, potentially exacerbating existing inequalities. This article not only contributes to the scholarly discourse on technological unemployment and income inequality but also serves as a foundation for evidence-based policymaking in navigating the uncharted territories of human-AI interaction.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Social Inequality, Labor Market Polarization, Skill-Biased Technological Change, Wage Distribution.

1. Introduction

"Day by day, the machines are gaining ground upon us; day by day we are becoming more subservient to them; more men are daily bound down as slaves to tend them, more men are daily devoting the energies of their whole lives to the development of mechanical life." [1]

As humans stand at the precipice of what some scholars term the "Fourth Industrial Revolution"[2], the potential for AI to reshape fundamental aspects of work, productivity, and social organization demands a rigorous reexamination of established theories and policy frameworks. Concurrently, the emergence of "foundation models" in AI [3] – large-scale, adaptable neural networks capable of performing a wide array of tasks – has introduced new dimensions to the debate on AI's economic implications. These models, exemplified by GPT-4 and its successors, demonstrate potential for generalized task performance that blurs traditional boundaries between narrow AI applications and more generalized cognitive capabilities. This development raises profound questions about the future trajectory of human-AI collaboration and competition across various economic sectors. Moreover, the distributional consequences of AI adoption extend beyond the labor market, potentially reshaping patterns of wealth accumulation and capital ownership. As Korinek and Stiglitz [4] argue that AI

could accelerate the trend towards "capital-biased technological change," , presenting a Janus-faced future of unprecedented productivity gains and potentially exacerbated inequality.

This article examines the complex impact of artificial intelligence on social inequality, revealing intricate interactions between skill restructuring, wage distribution, and power dynamics. It contextualizes the current technological revolution within the broader historical continuum of automation-driven productivity advances. Synthesizing a rich corpus of empirical evidence and evolving theoretical frameworks, this article elucidates the intricate dynamics of labor market transformation, skill obsolescence and regeneration, and wage distribution in the nascent AI epoch. Transcending conventional economic metrics, it explores broader societal implications, including the erosion of worker bargaining power and the existential ramifications for human labor in an increasingly automated world. This article not only contributes to the scholarly discourse on technological unemployment and income inequality but also critically examines the evolving relationship between technological progress and social equity. In doing so, we confront an economic landscape in flux, where the traditional nexus between productivity gains and wage growth has been severed, and the future of work itself is being radically reimagined.

2. Historical Context of Automation and Productivity

The early 18th and 19th centuries saw the birth of automation with the Industrial Revolution. This period marked a significant shift from manual labor and animal-based production to machine-based manufacturing. The introduction of steam power and mechanized production processes led to unprecedented increases in productivity and economic output. However, this transition was not without its social costs, as artisans and skilled craftsmen found their livelihoods threatened by the new industrial paradigm [5]. The Second Industrial Revolution, spanning from the late 19th to the early 20th century, brought about further advancements in automation through the widespread adoption of electricity and the assembly line. This period saw the emergence of scientific management principles, epitomized by Frederick Taylor's work, which sought to optimize labor productivity through the systematic analysis and reorganization of work processes [6]. While ostensibly aimed at optimizing productivity, Taylor's methods effectively divorced conception from execution in the labor process, leading to widespread deskilling and alienation among workers [7]. With the development of labor division, workers were required to focus on increasingly narrow and repetitive tasks, completing them at high speeds. This so-called Taylorist work organization method - also referred to as "scientific management" by organizational expert Frederick Taylor - created enormous pressure among workers, who found it increasingly difficult to identify with the final results of their work [6]. Consequently, in the 1960s, social movements began to erupt, expressing demands for the reduction of dehumanizing work, improvement of working conditions, and acceleration of wage growth. The post-World War II era witnessed the rise of computerization and the beginnings of what some scholars term the Third Industrial Revolution. This period saw the integration of electronic and information technologies into manufacturing processes, leading to the development of numerically controlled machine tools and early robotics [8]. The automation of cognitive tasks began to complement and, in some cases, replace the automation of physical labor that had characterized earlier periods [8]. Compared to the first two waves of technological logic transformation, the economic benefits brought by the Third Industrial Revolution, based on information and communication technology innovation and the introduction of robots, were much smaller. As Robert Solow's famous productivity paradox – "You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics" [9].

This paradox remains applicable in the age of artificial intelligence. Despite rapid technological advancements, many developed economies still experience slow productivity growth [10]. The late 20th and early 21st centuries have been marked by rapid advancements in digital technologies, giving

rise to what has been termed the Fourth Industrial Revolution or Industry 4.0. This era is characterized by the convergence of physical, digital, and biological technologies, with artificial intelligence playing a central role. Unlike previous waves of automation that primarily affected routine and manual tasks, AI has the potential to automate a wide range of cognitive and non-routine tasks. This has led to concerns about the potential for widespread job displacement across various skill levels and occupations [11]. Overall, existing research indicates that when the scope of analysis is extended to developing countries, the introduction of robots has had a significant and larger negative impact on employment [12]. Historical patterns also suggest that technological change often exacerbates inequality, benefiting capital owners and high-skilled workers at the expense of the broader workforce. Recent work by Korinek and Stiglitz [4] indicates that AI could accelerate this trend, potentially leading to a "singularity" of inequality where a small elite captures an ever-increasing share of economic benefits. Furthermore, Acemoglu and Restrepo [13] suggests that the current trajectory of AI development may be "so-so technologies" – innovations that displace workers without significantly increasing productivity. In light of these critical perspectives, it becomes clear that the historical relationship between automation and productivity is far from a linear narrative of progress. Instead, it is characterized by contradictions, unintended consequences, and persistent social challenges.

3. Labor Market Polarization and Skill Restructuring

Artificial intelligence, along with many other automation tools, affects human tasks in three main ways: through displacement, it reduces the demand for labor in automated tasks; through productivity, it raises the demand for labor in non-automated tasks; and through reinstatement, it designs new tasks for labor. Over time, the displacement effect of automation will be offset to some extent by its productivity and reinstatement effects, but the speed is highly uncertain [14]. This effect can be direct, significant, and obvious and is therefore essentially negative for employment in general and for labor's share of value added. However, the productivity and reinstatement benefit will take years, if not decades, to materialize—during which period, there will be considerable frictional and structural unemployment, wage losses, and growing inequality [15]. The long run—that vaguely defined concept often used by economists—finds automation, productivity growth, employment rates, and wage increases all proceeding in tandem.

The concept of skill-biased technological change (SBTC) has been a cornerstone in understanding the evolving dynamics of labor markets in the face of technological advancements. SBTC posits that technological progress disproportionately benefits high-skilled workers, leading to increased demand for their labor and, consequently, higher wage premiums [16]. For example, high-skilled workers (such as engineers, programmers, data scientists, etc.) become more important, while some medium-skilled and low-skilled jobs are replaced by machines and algorithms. This leads to a significant increase in income for high-skilled workers, while the income of medium-skilled and low-skilled workers stagnates or declines, widening the income gap. Figure 1 illustrates this trend using data from the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) [17]. In the context of AI, this phenomenon has taken on new dimensions. Unlike previous technological shifts that primarily affected routine tasks, AI's capacity to perform complex cognitive functions is reshaping the very nature of skill demand. Empirical evidence suggests that AI is not merely augmenting high-skilled labor but is also beginning to substitute for certain high-skill tasks, particularly those that are analytical and predictable in nature [18]. Recent research by Acemoglu and Restrepo [14] introduces the concept of "excessive automation," where AI technologies may be deployed even when the productivity gains do not justify the displacement of human labor, potentially exacerbating inequality and inefficiency.




Figure 1: The effect of AI adoption on employment types in Canada [17]


The task-based approach to labor market analysis, pioneered by Autor, Levy, and Murnane [19], provides a more nuanced framework for understanding the impact of AI on employment structures. This model disaggregates jobs into constituent tasks, categorizing them along two primary axes: routine versus non-routine, and cognitive versus manual. The advent of machines and algorithms has significantly altered the landscape of task automation, extending beyond routine tasks to encompass a wide array of non-routine cognitive tasks. This shift has led to a phenomenon known as "labor market polarization," characterized by the hollowing out of middle-skill jobs and the concurrent growth of both high-skill and low-skill employment [20]. As the Polanyi paradox suggests, many of the skills and knowledge we possess are acquired through practice and experience, rather than through explicit rules or theoretical learning [21]. These skills include complex judgments, intuition, and craftsmanship, which are difficult to teach machines through explicit instructions or algorithms, i.e., tasks involving what Polanyi [22] called "tacit" knowledge. This leads to a decrease in labor demand for job categories with high routine content (mostly middle-income). At the same time, other types of labor, namely abstract labor and manual labor, will benefit from improvements in computer capital efficiency. This explains why demand for high-skilled abstract workers and for manual laborers at the lower end of the income distribution actually increases. In other words, this is due to the strong complementarities between automation and labor that can increase productivity, raise incomes, and increase demand for labor. However, the impact of AI on this polarization trend is multifaceted and potentially non-linear. Today, AI can already "solve" some human tasks. As long as it is trained on examples and given an appropriate labeled image database and sufficient processing power, AI will provide solutions, which Autor [23] calls "Polanyi's revenge." As AI systems evolve to perform an ever-expanding array of tasks, the premium on uniquely human capabilities – such as complex problem-solving, creativity, and emotional intelligence – is likely to increase, reshaping the contours of labor market polarization in ways that are still unfolding [24].

4. Income Inequality and Wage Distribution

In sharp contrast, polarization has exacerbated wage gaps across workers, in which wages for those whose occupation was automated fell slowly, was stagnant, or was even negative, compared to the growing wages for those whose occupation benefitted from improvements in productivity or new task creation. As advanced, industrialized economies developed, this was directly linked with increasing income inequality, fundamentally due to a substantial wage gap or education premium between workers previously provided with a university or rigorous education that SBTC complemented and

those workers of lower education or training whose skills were now displaced [25]. Automation has also brought substantial displacement and polarization effects and has, moreover, contributed to wage growth increasingly becoming uncoupled with productivity growth [26]. In theory, wage growth should be at par with productivity growth in the long run. Still, growth in productivity has taken an unprecedented pace over three decades ago vis-à-vis average and median wage growth. As has been said, the long run can certainly be very long, with substantial and protracted deviations along the way. The decoupling of wage and productivity growth, then, has brought about a fall in the labor share of national income [27]. The fall in the labor share is partly driven by automation, not only is automation and the declining labor share most pronounced in manufacturing but even within manufacturing, the industries that are automating most rapidly. Moreover, the decline in labor's share of national income is mirrored by a rise in the share of capital, which not only reinforces the increase in income inequality but also concentrates capital returns at the top of the income pyramid. Over the past half-century, slow growth in pre-tax market income for the bottom 95% of wage-earners has been a major force behind the rise in income inequality across developed market economies—with automation playing an outsized role [28].

At the same time, we recognise AI may enhance human productivity in at least some of the currently performed tasks and may generate others for which human skills are needed that AI capabilities cannot substitute. Indeed, under most plausible assumptions about the pace of technological adoption and improvement, in 2030 social and emotional skills will be the most significant drivers of total working hours in developed economies [29] (see Figure 2). Specifically, occupations that require a high degree of emotional intelligence, creativity, and complex problem-solving – such as healthcare professionals, educators, and managers – are likely to see sustained or increased demand. The decline in hours worked for physical and manual skills (-11%) and basic cognitive skills (-14%) points to potential job losses or transformations in occupations such as manufacturing workers, clerical staff, and certain service industry roles. Importantly, these occupational changes may exacerbate wage and income inequality between workers whose skills are displaced by AI and those whose skills are complemented by it.



1. Calculated using the 2004 to 2016 CAGR extrapolated to a 14-year period.

NOTE: Based on difference between hours worked per skills in 2016 and modeled hours worked in 2030. Numbers may not sum due to rounding.

Figure 2: Projected Changes in Workforce Skill Requirements from 2002 to 2030 [29]

5. Impact on worker power and society

Labor markets are often not competitive in the narrow sense defined by economists. Sharing productivity gains with workers will be determined not only by market forces but also by relative power among workers and employers [15]. And relative power, shows up quite often in tax and social policies and in many of the institutional arrangements that have privileged owners over workers. While some recent studies, such as Acemoglu and Restrepo [13], show that replacing AI tends to shift power towards capital by substituting for human labor, enabling AI can augment worker productivity and create new task categories, potentially strengthening labor's position. However, sociologists and economists are very critical of the various forms of capitalism we have now because in many capitalisms, workers simply do not have enough power. As Korinek and Stiglitz [4] argue that AI-driven automation has accelerated the trend of capital-biased technological change, exacerbating the asymmetry in bargaining power between workers and employers. Their research indicates that as AI systems become more capable of performing a wider array of tasks, the threat of technological unemployment serves as a powerful lever for capital in wage negotiations, even in sectors not directly affected by automation. This phenomenon, which they term the "AI-induced bargaining effect," contributes to wage stagnation and the declining labor share of national income observed in many developed economies.

As Karl Marx [30] argued, work provides more than just income; it offers interpersonal relationships, meaning, and the potential for self-realization. This raises a crucial question: if artificial intelligence were to eliminate the need for human labor, would workers find the same level of fulfillment and happiness they experienced through work? Keynes [31] posited that humans have evolved with instincts and impulses geared towards solving economic problems. If these problems were to be resolved, he suggested, humans might be deprived of their traditional purpose. Indeed, work is far too significant for individuals and society to be viewed merely as a curse, a commodity, or solely as a source of income. Jennie Brand [32] emphasizes that unemployed workers suffer numerous psychological losses. They experience a loss of meaning, often becoming depressed, losing the structure of daily life, and forfeiting the social relationships formed through work. The repercussions extend beyond the individual, affecting families and communities, and can even manifest in physical health issues. When unemployed, individuals often feel a sense of personal failure, contributing to their unhappiness. Furthermore, the widespread adoption of AI is likely to have profound existential implications. Cave and Dihal [33] explore how AI is reshaping human self-understanding and our place in the world. They argue that as AI systems become more advanced, they challenge traditional notions of human uniqueness and cognitive superiority, potentially leading to a reevaluation of what it means to be human in the age of intelligent machines.

6. Conclusion

The analysis of this article shows that AI-driven automation is reshaping the labor market beyond mere job displacement. While the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) paradigm remains relevant, the task-based approach provides a more nuanced understanding of labor market polarization. AI is creating a new landscape of 'winners' and 'losers' based on the complementarity or substitutability of human skills with AI capabilities. The Polanyi paradox and its 'revenge' highlight the evolving nature of task automation, suggesting a potential re-polarization of the labor market. This article also underscores the decoupling of wage growth from productivity gains, contributing to a declining labor share of national income and exacerbating income inequality. The "AI-induced bargaining effect" emerges as a critical factor, potentially undermining worker power even in sectors not directly impacted by automation.

The findings of this article underscore the need for proactive policy interventions to mitigate the potentially deleterious effects of AI on social equality. Policymakers must grapple with the challenge of fostering innovation while ensuring equitable distribution of its benefits. A multifaceted approach is required, encompassing education reform, labor market policies, and social safety net enhancements. Education systems must be reimagined to emphasize skills that complement rather than compete with AI, focusing on creativity, emotional intelligence, and complex problem-solving. Lifelong learning initiatives and reskilling programs should be prioritized to facilitate smoother labor market transitions. Labor market policies should aim to rebalance power dynamics between workers and employers, potentially through strengthening collective bargaining rights or exploring novel forms of worker representation in the AI era. Additionally, policymakers should consider progressive taxation of AI-derived capital gains to fund a more robust social safety net, potentially including universal basic income schemes. These measures could help address the 'excessive automation' phenomenon identified by Acemoglu and Restrepo, ensuring that AI deployment aligns with broader societal interests rather than narrow profit motives.

This article also reveals several avenues for future research. First, there is a pressing need for more granular, longitudinal studies tracking the evolving relationship between AI adoption and labor market outcomes across different sectors and skill levels. Such research could provide valuable insights into the long-term dynamics of the 'productivity effect' and 'reinstatement effect' of AI. Second, interdisciplinary research combining economics, sociology, and psychology could further explore the societal and existential implications of widespread AI adoption, building on the work of Cave and Dihal [33]. This could include investigations into the changing nature of work-derived meaning and social cohesion in an AI-dominated economy. Third, comparative studies examining AI's impact across different economic systems and cultural contexts could yield insights into more equitable models of technological integration. Finally, there is a critical need for research into novel economic paradigms that can reconcile technological progress with social equity, potentially drawing on concepts from ecological economics or post-scarcity theory [34]. It is worth noting that, as we pursue these research avenues, we're compelled to confront a stark reality: These are difficult days for the labor movement. While in the rich countries of the center of capitalism, labor is fighting to hold on to existing wages and benefits under a combined assault by capital and governments, conditions of workers at the periphery are even harsher.

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